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ABSTRACT 
We formulate and solve a model of interdependent fuel and electric power 
infrastructure systems with explicit representation of the fuel required to run 
some electric power generators and the power required to heat and pump fuel. 
Our model determines a set of fuel and power flows that result in the minimum 
cost of operating both systems, including penalty costs for failing to deliver each 
material to each of several external customers. We then formulate models of 
each system separate from the other, and, for each system, represent each 
interdependent relationship as a demand node with associated penalties. We 
implement an iterative algorithm for solving various instances of the problem; the 
algorithm alternates between solving each system separately, and passing 
material requirements to the other model. We then evaluate how well our 
algorithm performs in comparison to the monolithic formulation. We conclude 
with suggestions for improvements to the algorithm. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States is a highly developed country where every aspect of life 
depends on complex and interconnected infrastructures. As a result of the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, we are more aware of how a small 
number of attacks could cause significant damage to this country through its 
critical infrastructure systems. Stopping all such attacks would be ideal, but this is 
an unrealistic goal, particularly when facing “attacks” from Mother Nature. 
Instead, research efforts in this area have focused on how to use limited 
resources to protect infrastructure to minimize the consequences of a successful 
attack against a small number of vital components. 
At the Naval Postgraduate School, current research is focused on the use 
of attacker-defender models that assume each opponent has limited resources, 
each has all of the pertinent information about the system, and each attack or 
defend optimally. The results from attacker-defender models give the 
infrastructure manager a clear understanding of the vulnerabilities in a system, 
and guidance for improving resilience, getting the biggest “reduction in bang” for 
their buck. 
The most important part of those modeling efforts is the formulation of a 
mathematical model that captures the operation of the infrastructure or 
infrastructures involved and is of the appropriate fidelity to accurately assess the 
consequences of an attack on, and the effectiveness of defenses to, that system 
or systems. When there are multiple, interconnected systems, the models that 
consider interdependencies between infrastructure systems become more 
complex and difficult to solve. 
In this thesis, we formulate a monolithic operational model of two 
interdependent infrastructure systems and solve it for a realistic instance of 
interdependent fuel and electric power systems. We then examine algorithms for 
solving these problems that iterate between smaller models of the individual 
 xvi 
systems, passing information about the requirements of each system to the 
model of the other system through shared data. This type of algorithm simulates 
the dynamic interaction between the two networks, and is a more realistic 
representation of how we might have to coordinate two large systems that are 
owned and operated by separate entities. Our focus is on examining the 
feasibility of solving multiple, less complex infrastructure models instead of one 
monolithic model that would be very hard to build and validate. 
In many cases, the algorithm converges to a reasonable solution for the 
operation of both systems, but consumes resources unnecessarily, providing 
excess capacity (and therefore, waste) in the two systems. We provide a simple 
mechanism for “turning off” this excess capacity without affecting the system 
performance, and the solutions obtained are much more reasonable, and closer 
to the solution of the monolithic model. 
In other cases, the algorithm provides solutions that are clearly (and 
significantly) suboptimal. For example, if the penalties for unmet demand on the 
interdependent systems are not large enough, then each system’s requirements 
might go unmet by the other system, leading to a rapid reduction in capacity for 
both systems. 
These iterative algorithms are not guaranteed to converge to the optimal 
solution except in the simplest of circumstances; nevertheless, they are 
representative of the kinds of algorithms we would expect to use in situations in 
which competing infrastructure operators are reluctant to share full operational 
information with each other. With a reasonable approach to modeling, the 
demands between the systems, and by setting the penalties appropriately on 
failing to meet those demands, the algorithms can provide realistic operational 
plans and insight into the costs of operating interdependent systems without the 
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The United States is a highly developed country where every aspect of life 
depends on complex and interconnected infrastructure systems. Business and 
industry, government agencies, schools and hospitals, and almost every other 
significant entity and activity rely on multiple types of infrastructures, from energy 
transmission systems to telecommunications, water, and transportation networks. 
As a result of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, we are more aware of 
how a small number of attacks could cause significant damage to this country 
through its critical infrastructure systems. Stopping all such attacks would be 
ideal, but this is an unrealistic goal particularly when “attacks” can also come 
from Mother Nature. Instead, research efforts in this area have focused on how 
to use limited resources to protect infrastructure to minimize the consequences of 
a successful attack against a small number of vital components.  
As the study of critical infrastructure systems has gained momentum, the 
focus has been centered on finding system weaknesses where an attack or 
series of attacks could cause the greatest damage, cost, or disruption, and on 
determining how best to improve resilience. At the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), this work is focused on the use of attacker-defender models (e.g., Brown 
et al. 2006) of sequential games played between two opponents, a defender of 
who operates an infrastructure system and wishes to protect it, and an attacker 
who wishes to damage that system. These models assume that each opponent 
has limited resources, each has all of the pertinent information about the system, 
and they attack or defend optimally. The results from attacker-defender models 
give the infrastructure manager a clear understanding of the vulnerabilities in a 
system, and guidance for improving resilience, getting the biggest “reduction in 
bang” for their buck.  
This type of research has been successfully applied to many different 
types of critical infrastructure systems. The most important part of those 
modeling efforts is the formulation of a mathematical model that captures the 
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operation of the infrastructure or infrastructures involved and is of the appropriate 
fidelity to accurately assess the consequences of an attack on, and the 
effectiveness of defenses to, that system or systems. 
There are many important infrastructure systems within the United States. 
Most of the current research usually assumes that any attack on a single 
infrastructure system affects that system only. Studies of single infrastructures 
can be quite useful; the simplification of the formulation makes the attacker-
defender models relatively easy to solve and the results can provide insights into 
the vulnerabilities of that system. However, many situations exist where an attack 
on one infrastructure systems could impact other systems. For example, a 
natural gas power plant requires water, telecommunications, gas delivery 
systems, as well as a transmission system to completely function, and is 
therefore dependent on these other infrastructures that provide those functions. If 
any of those supporting infrastructures are attacked, the power plant might not be 
able function. Any model that explicitly considers these dependencies (or, in the 
case of infrastructures that support each other, interdependencies) would be 
larger and more complicated than a single, independent infrastructure model. 
Much of the prior research in infrastructure defense has used 
mathematical programming models to determine the optimal operation of a single 
system both before and after an attack, assuming all other interdependent 
systems remain unaffected by an attack on that system. Recent efforts have 
modeled interdependencies between two systems in a single, monolithic model 
of operations that explicitly represents the connections between the two systems, 
but only small examples have been formulated and solved.  
In this thesis, we formulate a monolithic operational model of two 
interdependent infrastructure systems and solve it for a larger, more realistic 
instance of the problem. We then examine algorithms for solving these larger 
problems that iterate between smaller models of the individual systems, passing 
information about the requirements of each system to the model of the other 
system through shared data. This type of algorithm simulates the dynamic 
 3 
interaction between the two networks, and is a more realistic representation of 
how we might have to coordinate two large systems that are owned and operated 
by separate entities; major utilities usually consider their models proprietary and 
would not readily allow a monolithic model to be created, especially with a 
neighboring and potentially competing utility. Our focus is on examining the 
feasibility of solving multiple, less-complex infrastructure models instead of one 
monolithic model that would be very hard to build and validate.  
We summarize our results and offer some initial insights into the 
performance of these iterative algorithms in comparison to the optimal solution(s) 
obtained by the monolithic model, noting in particular when they are likely to 
work, and when they are likely to lead to extremely poor solutions. In many cases 
the algorithm converges to a reasonable solution for the operation of both 
systems, but consumes resources unnecessarily, providing excess capacity (and 
therefore waste) in the two systems. We provide a simple mechanism for “turning 
off” this excess capacity without affecting the system performance, and the 
solutions obtained are much more reasonable, and closer to the solution of the 
monolithic model. 
 4 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. PREVIOUS WORK ON INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURES 
This chapter presents a brief history of critical infrastructure protection, 
followed by a short description of how some researchers are addressing 
dependency between infrastructures. We then describe baseline models for the 
operation of electric power and fuel transmission networks which serve as the 
basis for our model of interdependent operation. 
1. Critical Infrastructure Beginnings 
Although 9/11 was a highly publicized example of the importance of critical 
infrastructure protection, the concept of homeland security dates back to the 
creation of the National Communications System (NCS) in 1963, after 
communication problems between the U.S. and USSR further threatened the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (Lewis 2006). It was then that U.S. leaders knew how 
failures of critical infrastructures could have widespread and lasting effects. At 
that time the major concerns centered on natural disasters or other forms of 
unintentional accidences. Hurricanes, for example, have been compared to a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD) with complete critical infrastructure failure 
(Miller 2006) resulting from their impact. Critical Infrastructures were later defined 
by President Clinton’s Executive Order 13010 of 1996, establishing the 
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) with initial 
objectives to evaluate the scope and nature of threats and weaknesses of critical 
infrastructures (Executive Order No. 13010 1996). An excerpt from this executive 
order is as follows:  
Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or 
economic security of the United States. These critical 
infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power 
systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and 
finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services 
(including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of 
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government. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two 
categories: physical threats to tangible property (“physical threats”), 
and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based 
attacks on the information or communications components that 
control critical infrastructures (“cyber threats”). Because many of 
these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the private 
sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work 
together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring 
their continued operation. (Executive Order No. 13010 1996) 
For a history of critical infrastructure in the U.S. up through the PCCIP, see 
Brown (2006). 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) describe the critical infrastructures of the U.S. as 
interdependent by physical means and also through information and 
communications systems. They describe ripple effects through direct and indirect 
failures within infrastructures. They use examples of the Galaxy 4 
telecommunications satellite and California’s prolonged power crisis to 
demonstrate how the direct and indirect failures in one infrastructure through 
interdependencies, cause failures in others. The conceptual framework provides 
our basis for work on interdependent systems. They define six dimensions of 
interrelated factors illustrated in Figure 1. They also touch on limitations and 
challenges of developing and validating models for infrastructure 
interdependency analysis, due to the complex of the relationship and difficulty of 
merging multiple systems into a single program. 
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Figure 1.  The six dimension perspective of infrastructure 
interdependency (from Rinaldi et al. 2001). 
Lee et al. (2007) discusses interconnectivity of infrastructures, focusing on 
how failures in one system may lead to disruptions in another. Their work 
segregates the systems into separate mathematical models specifically 
identifying the interdependencies by type and impact. Five types of infrastructure 
interdependencies are presented and incorporated into a network flows 
mathematical representation. They include: 
 Input dependence: An infrastructure that requires input commodity 
from one or more other infrastructures complete its service or 
function. 
 Mutual dependence:  Two or more infrastructures where each has 
a required input from the other to complete its service or function.  
 Shared dependence: Some commodity flow from an infrastructure 
is required in completing the service or function of two or more 
infrastructures. 
 Exclusive-or dependence:  An infrastructure can only produce or 
supply one service, function, or commodity at a time and it can only 
be received by one infrastructure of two or more at a time.  
 Collocated dependence: Part of two or more infrastructures are 
located in the same geographical location. 
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Lee et al. introduce three models of infrastructures from New York’s lower 
Manhattan region, including realistic data on the interconnections of the power, 
telecommunications, and subways, and then synthesizes a scenario that causes 
major disruptions in all the services, and finally demonstrating the use of the model 
as a guide to restore lost services.  
Kennedy et al. (2009) discusses how traditional infrastructure network 
models often lack the complexity to directly account for interdependent nature of 
critical infrastructures. His research describes a model of individual infrastructures 
together with special attention to modeling the interconnected dependencies. The 
model uses two sets of variables, one set that represents the infrastructure 
characteristics and another set that represents the specific interdependent 
elements. The mathematical formulation is then solved using Benders 
decomposition based on partitioning. 
Dixon (2011) builds on the definitions and theory described by Lee et al. 
(2007) demonstrating how to build dependent relationships between separate 
models. He then incorporates worst case attack on the interdependent systems 
with the responding best use of available resources increase resiliency, on small 
scale infrastructure models. Solutions to Dixon’s formulation show how dependent 
relationships between infrastructures can be used to explore vulnerabilities not 
available within the single-infrastructure models. 
Gun (2013) considers the development of a cloud-based computational 
platform for modeling and analysis of interdependent infrastructure systems. In his 
implementation, independent operator models reside on a computational server, 
whose architecture supports model interconnection essentially by automatically 
taking output data from one model and passing it as input to another model. Gun 
develops a novel scripting language for defining these data dependencies and 
automating their execution, and he implements a proof-of-concept prototype server 
that demonstrates the effectiveness of the solution for a simplified example of 
interdependent infrastructure systems optimization. However, this work does not 
consider any exploration of new mathematics or algorithms for solving the 
operation with these interdependencies. 
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2. Electrical Transmission Network 
In the IEEE Reliability Test System -1996, the Reliability Test System 
Task Force describes a reliability test system referred to as RTS-96, designed as 
a reference system to test reliability evaluation techniques, without any specific 
power system in mind. Figure 2 provides the structure of the RTS-96. 
 
Figure 2.  The IEEE One Area RTS – 96 is the basis for both Salmeron 
et al. (2004) and our electrical power system. It has 74 total 
nodes comprised of 33 generator nodes, 17 demand nodes, 
and 24 bus nodes. (from RTS Task Force 1999) 
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Salmerón et al. (2004) uses RTS-96 to create an electrical transmission 
model that closely approximates the actual physical characteristic and behaviors 
of power flow in a well-known and studied system. This is accomplished using a 
direct-current optimal power flow model, neglecting nonlinear losses and active 
power effects.   
3. Fuel Transmission Network 
Alderson et al. (2014) discuss the repeated disruptions in the critical 
infrastructures of the United States in recent years from various events, including 
natural disasters, accidental failures, and intentional attacks. Key to their discussion 
is the idea of using an operational model to assess system resilience to determine 
the best possible improvements to increase resilience. They demonstrate how their 
model determines optimal responses much the same way as real infrastructure 
owners and operators would. The scale and N-1 reliable design of the fuel system 
from Alderson et al. (2014) make it suitable for use as part of our research. Figure 3 
illustrates the fuel network from Alderson et al. (2014). 
 
Figure 3.  The network represents a fuel distribution model where the 
black filled circles are the supply nodes and the others have 
fuel demands, and the arcs represent establish connections 
between nodes (from Alderson et al. 2014). 
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B. OUR CONTRIBUTION IN CONTEXT 
Our research is an extension of Dixon’s initial work to a case study on 
realistic and moderately sized networks. We look towards the practical 
application of modeling interdependent critical infrastructure systems to 
determine if small sets of attacks can have a systemic, disproportionate effect, in 
other words a small unrecognized set of components that have little effect on a 
system in isolation have a dramatic effect or cost on our objective function in an 
inter-dependent model. We also compare the results from maintaining separate 
models with interdependent connections solved iteratively to the whole 
interdependent set of infrastructures modeled as one monolithic network, and 
concurrent or when solving a sequence of single models yields result that are 
comparable to those derived from a monolithic model. We discuss situations in 
which an iterative algorithm that solves a sequence of single-infrastructure 
models converges to (or nearly to) the solution of a monolithic model that 
considers all infrastructures simultaneously. 
 12 
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III. MODEL FORMULATION 
Critical infrastructures are frequently modeled in isolation. If there are 
important interdependencies between two infrastructures, these separate models 
can be combined into a single monolithic model that accounts for their 
interdependencies explicitly. However, in many cases these separate models 
cannot be combined (for instance, the entities involved might not want to share 
operational details with each other), and so other solution methods must be used 
that maintain the separate models to the extent possible.  
The dependent relationship described above is implemented in Dixon 
(2011). The graphical representation in Figure 4 shows a single dependence of 
one infrastructure on another. 
 
Figure 4.  Graphical representation from Dixon (2011) showing the 
requirement of a commodity from infrastructure I by II. 
In this figure, the activity ijY  along arc (i,j) in Infrastructure II depends on 
the availability of a resource at node n, represented by nijV , in infrastructure I. 
The mathematical form of the corresponding constraints follows as: 
 
 ij ij nijthreshold T V     
 
 ij ij ijY u T    
where ijthreshold  is the minimum amount of commodity from one infrastructure (I) 
to allow a component of the second infrastructure (II) to function properly. nijV  is 
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the flow of commodity from node n in infrastructure I to support the operation of 
component  ,i j  in infrastructure II. ijY  is the flow across component  ,i j  in 
infrastructure II. ijT  is a binary variable that is used to determine if the threshold 
requirement is met. ijT is set to zero when the flow nijV  of the required commodity 
is below the requirement ijthreshold  and may be set to one when nijV  is greater 
than or equal to ijthreshold . The parameter iju  represents the capacity of flow 
from nodes i to j.  ijY  is the commodity flow variable from i to j in infrastructure II. 
Note the two commodity streams are not joined or mixed. If node n in 
infrastructure I represents a demand node for a required commodity of a 
component within infrastructure I, and if the demand nijV  is met in infrastructure I, 
then ijY  in infrastructure II has capacity iju available. 
In this thesis, the two infrastructure systems in question are an electric 
power system and a fuel distribution system. Associated with each system is an 
operational model of the system, sometimes referred to as an “Operator 
Problem.” For the electric power system we have a Power Flow Model (PFM), 
and for the fuel system we have a Fuel Distribution Model (FDM). To distinguish 
between the models for these two systems, we adapt standard network flow 
notation. Specifically, we use a ‘p’ prefix to represent components of the 
electrical power network and an ‘f’ prefix to represent components of the fuel 
distribution model (see Figure 5).  
FArcCapfi,fj
FArcCostfi,fj
pi pj fi fj








Figure 5.  Distinctions in basic network flow notation for the electric 
power system and fuel distribution system. 
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Figure 6.  Convention for establishing interdependent sets between 
electric power and fuel distribution systems. 
Our work centers around modifying existing isolated critical infrastructure 
models using the methods initially described by Dixon (2011) to account for inter-
dependencies, and then solving to feasibility using an our iterative algorithm with 
the goal of determining if a small set of components within the combined systems 
may have an unusually drastic effect on the objective function. To demonstrate 
our ideas we start with two well-understood infrastructure networks with 
established, published, and proven formulations. The first is from Alderson et al. 
(2014), a FDM with their operator formulation. The other is the IEEE RTS-96 with 
the PFM from Salmerón et al. (2004).  
To establish the inter-connections between the two infrastructures and 
represent dependencies, we first must understand how and why the 
dependencies exist. Here we have a fuel system that requires power to operate 
pumps, valves, heating elements, etc., and an electrical distribution system that 
has generators that require fuel. The generators are represented as power 
sources in the PFM and fuel demand nodes within the FDM. The fuel oil 
suppliers including big pumping stations are represented as fuel supply nodes, 
specified arcs within the FDM, and are represented as power demand nodes 
requiring electricity within the PFM.  
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The next two sections, III A & B, describe how we implement the 
adaptations to Dixon (2011). In section III C we describe the how we implement 
the large combined model including both the electric and fuel systems that, when 
solved, establish the optimal solution (i.e.,. setting the target). The final 
formulation presented in III D, is our subroutine used to communicate the 
reduced need for power capacity by the power system from the fuel system. 
A. SETS, DATA, AND VARIABLES FOR OUR FORMULATIONS 
We start by establishing indices and index sets used through our 
formulations. 
1. Indices and Index Sets 
n FN  nodes in fuel network (alias fi, fj) 
n FD FN   demand nodes in fuel network 
n FS FN   supply nodes in fuel network 
FArcs FN FN   arcs in fuel network 
n PN  nodes in power network (alias pi, pj) 
n PD PN   demand nodes in power network 
n PG PN    generation (supply) nodes in power network 
n PI PN   bus nodes in power network (where supply = 0) 
PArcs PN PN   arcs in power network 
n PDN PN   power demand nodes that supply fuel components 
 , nfi fj PDFA FArcs   power-dependent fuel arcs:  , nfi fj PDFA  can only 
carry flow if power supply to n PDN exceeds a 
given threshold. 
n FDN FN    fuel demand nodes that supply power components 
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 , npi pj FDPA PArcs   fuel-dependent power arcs:  , npi pj FDPA  can only 
carry flow if fuel supply to n FDN exceeds a given 
threshold 
2. Parameters (Units) 
nFSupply  fuel supply at node n FN [bbl/hr]  
nFLdSCost  fuel load shedding cost of demand node n FD [$/bbl]  
fi, fjFArcCost  per-unit cost to move fuel on arc  ,fi fj [$/bbl]  
fi, fjFArcCap  capacity of fuel on arc  ,fi fj [bbl/hr]  
nPDem  power demand at node n [MW]  
pi ,pjPArcCap  power capacity of  ,pi pj [MW]  
pi ,pjPY  power flow across power arc  ,pi pj [MW]  
nPThresh  power threshold required by power demand node 
n PDN [MW]  
nPGenCap  power generator capacity of n PG [MW]  
nPGenCost  power generator cost per MW by node n PG [$/MWh]  
nPLdSCost  power load shedding cost of node n PD  [$/MWh]  
pi,pjPArcRes  resistance of arc  ,pi pj   ohms  
pi,pjPArcRea  reactance of arc  ,pi pj   ohms  
,pi pjB  susceptance of arc  ,pi pj   1 ohms  
fi , fjFY  fixed fuel flow across arc  ,fi fj  [bbl/hr]  
nFThresh  fuel threshold required by power generation node 
n FDN  [bbl/hr]  
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3. Decision Variables (Units) 
fi, fjFY  flow on fuel arc  ,i jf f  [bbl/hr]  
nFLdS  load shedding at fuel demand node n FD  [bbl/hr]  
nFT  =






nPGen  power generated at generator node n PG  [MW]  
pi,pjPY  flow on power arc  ,pi pj  [MW]  
nPLdS  load shedding at power demand node n PD  [MW]  
nθ  phase angle at power node n PN   radians  
nPT  =







B. FUEL DISTRIBUTION MODEL FORMULATION 
This section presents details for our generalized interdependent operator’s 
model of the fuel distribution model (FDM). This formulation is an expansion of 
concepts discussed in Chapter II as well as in Alderson et al. (2014). Without the 
loss of generality, the following mixed-integer formation represents a standard, 
single-commodity network flow problem with supplies and demands. 
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1. Formulation of Fuel System Operators Model 
 
 
   
 








min fi fj fi fj n n
FY FLdS fi fj FArcs n FD
FT
n, fj fi,n n n
fj: n, fj fi: fi,n
FArcs FArcs
fi, fj fj, fi fi fj
fi, fj fj, fi fi
FArcCost FY FLdSCost FLdS
FY FY FLdS FSupply n FN










   
   
 
   






, fj n n
pi,n n pjn n
pi: pi,n PArcs pj: n,pj PArcs
fi, fj
n
FT n PDN fi, fj PDFA
PThresh FT PY PY n PDN










The objective function, (F0), calculates the total cost of fuel transport 
across arcs in the network and the total penalty paid for unsatisfied demand. 
Constraints (F1) enforce balance of flow at each node. Constraints (F2) and (F5) 
ensure bounds on the fuel flow decision variables, ,fi fjFY . Constraints (F3) 
enforce bounds on flow decision variables when the dependence threshold 
variables are set to zero. Constraints (F4) set the dependence threshold variable 
nFT  based on the last known operating conditions in the power system. 
Constraints (F4) are the only place in which we model the power system, and 
although we could eliminate (F4) entirely by pre-calculating the values of the nFT  
variables, we retain them because they exactly parallel one set of 
interdependence constraints from the monolithic formulation. Constraints (F6) 
require that dependence threshold variables, nFT , are binary.  
In this formulation we use two non-negative variables to solve for the flow 
paths of the commodity, ijFY , and the amount of commodity shorted to customer 
n, nFLdS . The last variable is a binary switch modeling the interdependence, 
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,nFT  which is set to one when the net supply received by demand node n  within 
the electrical distribution system meets or excessed the power requirement or 
threshold, nFThresh , allowing full capacity for the corresponding fuel path on 
arc  ,fi fj . The model also only allows for positive flow and assumes a set 
contracted cost for service. The driving force for commodity flow is to avoid 
shortfall penalties for load shedding and minimizing delivery cost i.e., pumping 
path length, maximizing efficiency. The model features elastic parameters in the 
form of penalties for load shedding, maintaining feasibility and easy with which to 
work.  
C. POWER FLOW MODEL FORMULATION 
The following formulation describes our second generalized 
interdependent network, represented as a power flow model (PFM). This 
formulation is an expansion of concepts discussed in Chapter II from Salmerón et 
al. (2004) and Dixon (2011). Without the loss of generality, we build on the 
mixed-integer formulation using a direct-current approximation of an alternating-
current electrical transmission system. We use the attributes that align with the 
actual RTS-96. The RTS-96 includes multiple types of power generation with 
associated costs per Megawatt-hour (MWhr).  
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1. Formulation of Power Flow Model with Interdependence 
 
     
   
 




: , : ,
, ,






n n n n
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pi,pj pi,pj pj pi
pi n n pj
pi pi n pj n pj
PArcs PArcs
n pi n n pj
pi pi n pj n pj
PArcs PArcs
PGenCost PGen PLdSCost PLdS
PY = B θ -θ pi, pj PArcs
PY PY n PI
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The objective function, (P0), calculates the total cost to generate power 
and the total penalty cost of load shed (i.e., unmet demand). Constraints (P1) 
approximate active power flows on the arcs. Constraints (P2) maintain power 
balance at bus nodes. Constraints (P3) maintain power balance at generator 
nodes. Constraints (P4) maintain power balance at demand nodes. Constraints 
(P5) set the dependence threshold variable nPT  based on last know operating 
conditions in the FDM. Constraints (P5) are the only place where the fuel system 
is considered, and while we could pre-calculate the values of nPT  variables, we 
retain them because they exactly parallel one set of interdependence constraints 
from the monolithic formulation. Constraints (P6) enforce restricted bounds on 
power flow decision variables when the dependence threshold variable is set to 
zero. In this formulation we use three continuous variables to solve for the flow 
paths of the electrical power, ,pi pjPY , the amount of electrical power shorted to 
customer n , nPLdS , and the amount of electrical power supplied by generator n
, nPGen , The last variable is a binary switch, nPT , which is set to one when net 
fuel supplied to demand node n  in the FDM meets or exceeds its fuel 
requirement (threshold), nFThresh . This allows full capacity for the corresponding 
interdependent power components. It is understood that the path of electrical 
power follows Kirchhoff’s Law, but computation is required within our model to 
complete power balances at each node, not for determining optimal flow patterns 
of electricity. The power flow model differs from the FDM in that it has assigned 
costs for generating and shedding electrical power, and does not include a 
transmission costs. The driving force for power generation and flow to demand 
nodes is to minimize the objective function where it is more efficient to generate 
power using the cheapest generators available and transport it to the demand 
nodes, than to pay the load shedding cost for load shedding.  
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D. FULL COMBINED MODEL 
The following formulation describes the combination of the FDM and 
Power Flow models. This formulation includes fuel supply and demand nodes, 
power supply and demand nodes as well as constraints requiring flow balances 
at each node which correspond to the specific type of node (bus, generator, 
demand). It also explicitly models the interdependencies between the two 
systems. 
1. Formulation of the Full Combined Model 
 
 
         







F1 , F2 , F3 , F5 , F6
P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 , P6 , P7 , P8 , P9 , P10
min fi, fj fi, fj n n
FY FLdS fi fj FArcs n FD
FT PY PY
PGen PLdS
n n n n




FArcCost FY FLdSCost FLdS
PGenCost PGen PLdSCost PLdS































The objective function (C0) simply calculates the sum of the costs in each 
system as presented in (F0) and (P0). Constraints (C1) and (C2) model the 
interdependencies between the two systems. Constraints (C1) require that net 
supply of electrical power to power demand nodes meet or exceed the threshold, 
nPThresh ,  to allow fuel flow on the corresponding FDM arc  ,fi fj . Constraints 
(C2) require the net supply of fuel to fuel demand node n  meet or exceed the 
threshold requirement, nFThresh , to allow flow on the corresponding 
interdependent power arc ( , )pi pj .  
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E. EXCESS CAPACITY SUBPROBLEM 
The following formulation is an expansion of the standard knapsack 
problem. If there is excess power generation capacity (i.e., more power is being 
generated than is needed by all of the demands in the system, including 
interdependent demand from the fuel system), it determines which dependent 
generators from the set, GRF, could be shut down without impacting the power 
supplied to the demand nodes while saving fuel transportation costs. 
1. Indices and Index Sets: 
n PG PN   power generation nodes in the power networks 
n PD PN   power demand nodes in the power networks 
n GRF PN   power generation nodes that require fuel from FDM 
2. Parameters (Units): 
dPDem  power demand of node d megawatts  
gPGenCap  power generator capacity of g megawatts  
gPGenCost  power generator cost per MW by node g
 dollars megawatt hours  
3. Decision Variables (Units): 
nOFF   =






4. Formulation of the Subroutine: 
 
 






n n n n
n GRF n PG n PD
n
PGenCost PGenCap OFF







    
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5. Discussion 
The objective function, (K0), determines the cost savings that can be 
realized by turning off a subset of excess oil dependent generators. The decision 
variables are a matrix of binary variables, OFFn, one for each fuel oil dependent 
generator. If OFFn is equal to 1 then generator n is not used, and the 
corresponding fuel demand in FDM is set to 0. If OFFn is set to 0 then generator n 
is available and corresponding demand in the FDM exists. This model is used to 
remove excess generator capacity so as to reduce the fuel requirements and 
create a solution closer to the optimal in the overcapacity case.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We expand on the ideas from Lee et al. (2007) and Dixon (2011) to 
develop a realistic and reasonably-sized instance of two interdependent 
infrastructure systems. We solve the resulting operational problem with our 
monolithic combined model to establish a baseline optimal solution, and then 
apply our iterative solution algorithm using the two separate models, using a few 
different policies to set the penalties on unmet demand in the dependent 
infrastructure components. We comment on how these different penalty policies 
can affect the solution reached by our algorithm, and how they can be used to 
influence the performance of the combined system. Finally, we implement a 
knapsack subproblem that we use as part of a subroutine in our algorithm to help 
eliminate wasteful fuel distribution. This routine helps close the optimality gap in 
cases where we have excess capacity in one or both systems.  
A. THE CASE STUDY BACKGROUND AND SETUP 
To demonstrate our methods on dependent infrastructures, we use two 
previously published systems that give us the ability to understand and anticipate 
results as well as help verify and validate our formulations. While we focus on a 
specific example to demonstrate our methods, we do so without loss of 
generality; our models and algorithms scale with the size of the individual 
infrastructure models involved.  
The RTS-96 system (Figure 2) is an electrical generation and transmission 
system. The RTS-96 has 33 generator nodes with various generation types, 
including nuclear, coal, oil, and hydroelectric, all with different associated costs. It 
has 17 different demand nodes with different requirements, and 24 bus nodes 
that connect the power generation to power demands in a realistic way. 
Salmeron et al. (2004) provides a mathematical programming formulation of the 
operation of the RTS-96.  
 28 
The fuel delivery system we model (Figure 3) is an N-1 reliable network 
having two supply nodes, 14 demand nodes, and bidirectional arc flows. The 
basis for modeling this system is a standard single commodity flow model with 
supplies and demands, minimizing total delivery costs, modified to add 
dependence on a separate infrastructure. The model has built-in elasticity with 
the possibility of shedding demand loading with an assigned penalty and is 
discussed in detail in Alderson et al. (2014). 
Each infrastructure system model has dependencies on the other system: 
some of the fuel pumps in the fuel distribution model (FDM) require power from 
the electrical system, and some of the generators in the electrical system require 
fuel from the FDM.  
The overall problem we wish to solve is to determine the optimal operation 
of both systems, so that all requirements (fuel and power) are met at minimum 
total cost. However, we anticipate that in a real setting we might not have access 
to models of both systems simultaneously, and that formulating and solving a 
single, monolithic model of the combined system might not be possible. 
To this end, our operational model of each system represents the 
requirements of the other system as demands, with corresponding penalties for 
load shedding. The appropriate setting of these penalties for load shedding is key 
to the effective use of these models. 
Our background scenario for inter-dependence follows concepts described 
by Lee et al. (2007) and demonstrated using small (e.g., three-node) networks in 
Dixon (2011). Although in reality inter-dependence often extends beyond just two 
networks, our system remains moderate in complexity, adding features which 
smaller instances, like those presented in Dixon (2011), could not. The 
commodity in the fuel delivery system is assumed to be number 6 fuel oil. We 
acknowledge the known difficulties and limitations associated with a fuel 
distribution model pumping this type of fuel due to its high viscosity at standard 
temperature, but assume those limitation have been overcome. RTS-96 was 
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designed with prescribed power generation and demand loadings. These 
numbers are found in Figures 7 and 8 and are the basis for the fuel demand 
numbers within the FDM, applying elementary energy and unit conversions 
(Reliability Test System Task Force 1999).  
From the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (Energy 
Information Administration 2014) we ascertain that about 533 kilowatt hours can 
be produced from a 42 gallon barrel of number 6 fuel oil. When operated by 
major U.S. investor-owned electric utilities, average power generation expenses 
in 2012 were as follows:   
 Fossil stream: $31.89 per megawatt hour 
 Nuclear:  $25.48 per megawatt hour 
 Hydroelectric: $11.34 per megawatt hour 
 Small turbine: $35.69 per megawatt hour. 
These prices are used as cost coefficients in our model for the corresponding 
power generating systems. Additionally, from the EIA, we find the current and 
projected cost per barrel of number 6 fuel oil is approximately $100; the penalty for 
load shedding is set at $150 per barrel in the FDM model for our base case. 
To integrate the two systems and ensure that the dependencies remain 
within the same order of magnitude, we use EIA data starting with:  
 the estimate of 533.4 kilowatt hours generated per barrel of number 
6 fuel oil, and  
 the RTS-96 capacity for the oil fired generators to calculate a 
baseline demand for fuel by each generator within the FDM.  
Specifically, RTS-96 has 15 generators powered using number 6 fuel oil at 
five separate locations. Thus, we assume that the five separate locations are 
different fuel oil power plants fed by the FDM. This demonstrates the first 
dependent relationship between the two systems: an oil-fired generator node 
from the RTS-96 requires fuel supplies from the FDM in order to run. Table 1 
shows which fuel demand nodes correspond to the specific fuel oil generators. 
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For example, generator node 101g c  requires fuel from the FDM and is part of 
the fuel demand at node 15fn . 
Oil Firer Generator 






(barrels / hr)  
g101c,d fn15 152 285 
g102c,d fn13 152 285 
g107a,b,c fn4 240 450 
g113a,b,c fn16 285.3 535 
g115a,b,c,d,e fn1 60 112.5 
Table 1.   Fuel dependent generators from RTS-96 and their 
corresponding nodes within the FDM with associate generating 
capacity and tabulated fuel demand from our calculations. 
To model complex infrastructures with dependencies we opt to build and 
test the infrastructures as independent standalone networks, validate their 
responses against current knowledge or literature, then add inter-dependencies. 
This alleviates the requirement for one individual to learn about and construct 
models for every system with interdependence, and instead allows for the 
separate models to be built by different teams and then tied together and solved 
using algorithms like ours. With this process in mind we model the FDM and RTS-
96 separately. The results for the FDM system were validated against the results in 
Alderson et al. (2014). The results for the IEEE RTS-96 system were similarly 
inspected for consistency and correctness: cheaper power generation is used 
before more expensive, all power flows balance, all demands are met or loads are 
explicitly shed when necessary, and production never exceeds demand.  
We show how to incorporate two or more functioning models to include 
dependencies. In our simplified case study, the FDM requires electrical power to 
both heat and pump fuel from supply to demand nodes. While the cost of these 
functions is easily incorporated into the model without modeling the explicit 
dependence on the power model, there is no opportunity for modeling the 
consequences of losing this power. The same argument exists with respect to 
fuel required for the generators within RTS-96. No power can be generated 
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without fuel, so modeling an electrical transmission system without an 
understanding of the connected FDM also eliminates our ability to calculate the 
consequence of losing this fuel supply. Figures 7 and 8 show the specific 
locations of dependence.  
In Figure 7, we show the complete FDM in purple and interdependent 
generators of the PFM in green. The five power plants from RTS-96 are shown 
with all the associated generator nodes. The generator nodes require a fuel 
supply. The dashed lines show conceptually where the fuel supply manifests 
itself in the FDM as a demand node. For example, 107g a  has fuel demand node
4fn  in the FDM, and this demand must be filled for 107g a  to produce power up 
to its capacity in the PFM.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
fn1 fn2 fn3 fn4
fn5 fn6 fn7 fn8
fn9 fn10 fn11 fn12









Fuel Demand Entities (barrels per hour)
Power Plants     Other Customers
fn1 112.5 fn2 100 fn9 100
fn4 450 fn3 100 fn11 100
fn13 285 fn5 100 fn12 100
fn15 285 fn6 100 fn14 100








Figure 7.  RTS-96 positions of fuel dependence 
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In Figure 8, we illustrate how the FDM receives electrical power from the 
PFM and which components specifically require electrical power to function. For 
example, the pumps and heating elements in arcs  6, 10fn fn  have a 
corresponding electrical demand node ( 103d ) in the PFM. A total of four demand 
nodes from RTS-96 (in green) have interdependencies that are shown with the 
dashed line connecting it to its electrical component in the FDM.  
fn1 fn2 fn3 fn4
fn5 fn6 fn7 fn8
fn9 fn10 fn11 fn12





 Power Demand Entities (MWatts per hour)
 Fuel Distribution    
 Power Requirements     Other Customers
 d103 180 d101 108 d110 195
 d105 71 d102 97 d113 265
 d114 194 d104 74 d115 317
 d116 100 d106 136 d118 333
d107 125 d119 181
d108 171 d120 128
d109 175
 
Figure 8.  FDM positions of electrical power dependency 
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In summary, Figure 7 and Figure 8 present the supplies and demands for 
each system, along with the corresponding interdependencies as viewed by each 
infrastructure in isolation. However, as we observe in the next section, this view 
of the requirements imposed by supplies and demands changes when we 
consider the combined interdependent operation of both systems. 
B. SOLUTION FROM THE COMBINED MODEL 
The combined model solves for the optimal operation of both the electric 
power and fuel systems as an integrated whole. That is, the combined model 
seeks to achieve the lowest combined operating cost, with tradeoffs between the 
costs borne by each system defined by the coefficients in equation (C0). This is 
the solution that could be obtained if both infrastructure systems were operated 
by a single entity that has complete visibility of the internal details of both 
systems. 
We use CPLEX 12.6.0 (GAMS 2014) with GAMS 24.2.1 (GAMS 2014) to 
solve the combined model as well as the individual models. The combined model 
consists of 1015 constraints over 606 variables, 38 of which are binary. CPLEX 
solves the combined model to an approximate 1% optimality gap within less than 
a tenth of a second. Solving the combined model yielded, in every attempt, a 
feasible and optimal solution for the overall objective function. The optimal 
solution to this monolithic formulation of our two systems together provides the 
optimistic lower bound we strive to attain using our algorithms for solving the 
interdependent operation using separate models for each system.  
The combined model finds solutions that balance load shedding penalties 
in both systems and determines an operational plan that might not be obvious 
when modeling either system individually. For example, the combined model 
reveals inefficiencies associated with delivering fuel to a power plant that is not 
used except to provide power to the fuel system that feeds that power plant. 
When the power and fuel models are solved simultaneously, the combined model 
shuts off some of the generators as well as some of the fuel components to 
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reduce the total operating cost. Specifically the combined model sheds the 
following internal electrical loadings: 
 d103, (180mwhr) 
 d114, (194mwhr)  
 d116, (100mwhr)   
Shedding these loads increases the objective value of the fuel portion of 
the system by forcing a portion of the fuel to travel longer distances along arcs 
(fn6,fn10), (fn10,fn11), (fn4,fn8), and (fn8,fn12). In addition, supply from supply 
node fn8 can no longer be used without the corresponding electrical power 
demand being filled. We also observe a reduced demand within the fuel system, 
as the following fuel demands are eliminated with less power demanded: 
 FN4, (450 barrels/hr) 
 FN15, (285 barrels/hr) 
 FN16, (535 barrels/hr) 
Figure 9 shows the configuration of the nodes of the optimal solution for 
the combined model. We consider this solution and its objective value of 
$71,691, the best possible given the conditions. As we explore alternative 
methods to solve this problem maintaining separate models, we will use the 
results here as a baseline for comparison.  
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Figure 9.  Results from the solving the combined (monolithic) model 
C. ITERATIVE ALGORITHM  
An optimal solution to our monolithic combined model provides the 
operations of both the fuel and power systems that minimize the total operating 
cost across both systems. We now use an iterative algorithm, as described in 
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demands) and the power model (with fixed fuel demands), at each step passing 
enough of the solution to the current model as input data for the next model, until 
neither model’s optional solution changes. 
 
Figure 10.  Pseudocode of iterative algorithm to solve for interdependent 
operation of fuel and electric power systems. 
To solve for the operation of the two interconnected but separate models, 
our algorithm simply solves the fuel model, making the resulting flows available 
to the power model. Then it solves the power model making the results available 
to the fuel model. This repeats until the individual objective functions have 
converged. In this way, our iterative algorithm produces behavior that is similar to 
what might happen in practice if each system is operated independently, with 
information about demands coming only at the boundary between systems. It is 
possible that this interaction results in complicated transient behavior (e.g., 
oscillations or cycling), however, our focus is on the equilibrium solution of this 
interaction. 
The fuel model consists of 161 constraints over 91 variables, 9 of which 
are binary. The power model consists of 869 constraints over 544 variables, 29 





a. Solve fuel model given fixed demands from 
current power solution 
b. Record current fuel solution and power 
requirement 
c. Solve power model given fixed demands from 
current fuel solution 
d. Record current power solution and its fuel 
requirements 
 
3) Until fuel solution and power solution do not change  
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of which are binary. CPLEX solves each model to within a 1% optimality gap 
almost instantly, although the solution created by combining these individual 
infrastructure solutions is usually not within the same optimality gap for the 
combined model. We explore modifications to attempt to close the gap between 
the actual optimal solutions from the combined model and solving the separate 
models, ending with our knapsack type subroutine.  
Using our iterative algorithm, we investigate the behavior of these 
interdependent infrastructure systems for two basic scenarios: 
 Scenario 1: All generators available, such that power generation 
capacity is greater than demand; 
 Scenario 2: Loss of 13.3% of generating capacity, resulting in power 
generation capacity less than demand. 
For each of these scenarios, we consider the interdependent operation of these 
systems under three different operating conditions, defined by different penalty 
costs: 
 Equal penalties on load shedding across all demand nodes in both 
models; 
 Double the penalties on interdependent demand nodes than that of 
independent (i.e., customer) nodes for load shedding; 
 No penalties on interdependent demand nodes for load shedding. 
The following sections discuss the results for these scenarios using our iterative 
algorithm, accompanied by analysis and insights. 
D. SCENARIO 1: SYSTEM OPERATION WHEN THERE IS EXCESS 
POWER GENERATION CAPACITY  
We now describe the results from our iterative algorithm in the scenario when 
there is an excess power generating capacity. 
 
1. Equal/constant load shedding penalty on all demand nodes 
from each system. 
In the base case for our analysis, we assume that all generators are 
available (so there is excess generation capacity) and the load shedding 
penalties are high and equal for all demand nodes across both systems.  
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Table 2 summarizes the progression of our algorithm for the base case 
when solving interdependent operator models. In iteration 1 we solve the FDM 
model to optimality as an isolated system. We observe that all the fuel demands 
are met in this iteration. The results are then passed as parameters to the PFM. 
In iteration 2 the PFM is solved to optimality with the results passed as 
parameters back to the FDM. Solving our base case requires only one solve per 
model, or two total iterations, in order to achieve stable results. The sum of the 
FDM and PFM objective values is the total objective value and in this 
configuration is $84,053, which is the best obtainable value ignoring 
interdependence and assuming each system is isolated. Comparing this to the 
solution from the combined model we see the iterative algorithm yields results 
that are 17.2% higher. The operating solution obtained when using our iterative 
algorithm for the separate models results in fuel being supplied to every demand 
node. Thus, we observe that even though each system is performing optimally in 
isolation, the overall operating cost is higher than it could be if the two systems 
were operated as a single entity. This can be explained looking closer at the 
combined model results. 
The FDM objective value increases by 6.2% when solved as a combined 
model which would not happen in isolation no matter how many iterations were 
run. The increase comes from shedding fuel demands which are providing fuel to 
an over capacity electrical power generation system at a cost higher than its 
return value. The PFM objective value goes down in response, due to less 
electricity demand from the fuel model due to shutting down nonessential fuel 
model components, reducing it by 15.9% versus the PFM being solved in 
isolation. Thus, we see a net decrease of 14.7% for the entire system.  
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Full Generating Capacity Available & Constant and Equal Load Shedding Penalty 














1 FDM 4460 N/A N/A 
Optimal FDM solution in isolation, 
no load shedding 
2 PFM 4460 79593 84053 
Optimal PFM solution in isolation, 
no load shedding 
3 FDM 4460 79593 84053 
No Change, stable condition met in 
FDM 
4 PFM 4460 79593 84053 
No Change, stable condition met in 
PFM 
Combined Model  4735 66956 71691 
Combined solution has total costs 
17.2% lower than iterative solution 
Table 2.   Results from our initial iterative algorithm with all 
generators available and a constant and equal load shedding 
penalties on all demand nodes for each system. 
2. Double the load shedding penalty on all the interdependent 
demand nodes for each system 
In this case, we increase the load shedding penalty costs for the 
interdependent demand notes by a factor of two. We expect this will make each 
standalone system more sensitive to a potential shortfall in the other, and 
therefore not likely to short those demands, choosing instead to short demands 
on its customers first. Table 3 summarizes the progression of our iterative 
algorithm for this case. Iteration 1 of our algorithm solves the FDM model to 
optimality as an isolated system. We observe that all the fuel demands were met, 
and the resulting solution is passed as parameters to the PFM. Iteration 2 solves 
the PFM to optimality; in this solution all electrical demands are met using the 
minimum cost set of generators. The results are passed as parameters back to 
the FDM in Iteration 3 where we find the stable solution. The total objective value 
in this configuration is $84,053, as before. As expected, the higher load shedding 
penalties (and excess commodity capacities) drove the separate models to 
supply commodity to every demand node. 
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Full Generating Capacity Available & Double Load Shedding Penalty on                                      














1 FDM 4460 N/A N/A Optimal FDM solution in 
isolation, no load shedding 
2 PFM 4460 79593 84053 Optimal PFM solution in 
isolation, no load shedding 
3 FDM 4460 79593 84053 
No Change, stable 
condition met in FDM 
4 PFM 4460 79593 84053 
No Change, stable 
condition met in PFM 
Combined Model  4735 66956 71691 
The following loads were 





100mwhr.                
Table 3.   Results from our initial iterative algorithm with all 
generators available and double the load shedding penalties on 
interdependent demand nodes.  * Independent demand node. 
3. No load shedding penalty on all the interdependent demand 
nodes for each system. 
To continue exploring the effects of penalties on the interdependent 
nodes, we now alter our base case by making the load shedding penalties on 
interdependent demand nodes zero. Table 4 summarizes how the algorithm 
progresses. Iteration 1 of our algorithm solves the FDM model to optimality as an 
isolated system. Here we observe that the lack of a load shedding penalty on the 
interdependent nodes results in a decision not to fill their associated fuel 
demand. The operating cost for the FDM is cut by 64% when it does not deliver 
fuel to these nodes. The solution is then passed as parameters to the PFM. 
Iteration 2 solves the PFM to optimality as an isolated system. Because there are 
no load shedding penalties, we observe that all generators that require fuel oil to 
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produce power (interdependent generators) do not produce any electricity—as a 
result the interdependent power demand nodes also do not receive power. The 
PFM uses its previously extra capacity with alternate and more expensive 
generators to meet power demands; this drives up the PFM objective value. But 
without the fuel oil generators there is not enough capacity to fill all the 
independent demands. Thus, we see load shedding from some of the 
independent demand nodes (in this case, d119 and d120 shed 195 megawatt 
hours of their power demand). The overall effect on the PFM objective value is a 
reduction of 11.1% to $70,771. The results are passed as parameters to the FDM 
in iteration 3. Iteration 3 solves the FDM again and all the interdependent fuel 
demand components requiring power do not receive any. This results in an entire 
FDM system shutdown, and the FDM objective value at its max of $135,000.  
Comparing these results to our base case we see here an extra iteration is 
required, and the total objective value and in this configuration is $205,771 
(187% from our combined model). We see the separate models behaving much 
differently than in our base case and in the combined model. In the optimal 
solution to the combined model balances the penalties for not filling dependent 
demands with those of not filling the demands of customers, and can determine 
exactly how much power and fuel to deliver to both. In the previous cases, the 
penalty for load shedding on the interdependent demands is the driving force to 
fill those demands, but having a zero load shedding penalty on dependent nodes 
ensures that no materials are delivered to them, which results in reduced 




Full Generating Capacity Available & No Load Shedding Penalty on                                                  














1 FDM 1600 N/A N/A 
All interdependent fuel 
demand nodes loadings 
were shed 
2 PFM 1600 70771 72371 
All interdependent power 
demand nodes loadings 
were shed plus d119-181 
mwhr* & d120-14 mwhr* 
3 FDM 135000 70771 205771 
No fuel is delivered, all fuel 
demands are shed 
4 PFM 135000 70771 205771 
No Change, stable 
condition met in PFM 
5 FDM 135000 70771 205771 
No Change, stable 
condition met in FDM 
Combined Model  4735 66956 71691 
The following loads were 





100mwhr.                                                                        
Table 4.   Results from our initial iterative algorithm with all 
generators available and no load shedding penalties on 
interdependent demand nodes.  * Independent demand node. 
E. SCENARIO 2: SYSTEM OPERATION WHEN GENERATING CAPACITY 
IS LESS THAN DEMAND 
We now revisit the previous three cases for interdependent different 
penalty costs, in the scenario when there’s a failure to a major component, 
specifically a nuclear power plant, at node g118, with a 400 megawatt capacity. 
With the loss of this component the system total generation capacity is less than 
the total demand in the PFM. 
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1. Equal/constant load shedding penalty on all demand nodes 
from each system. 
As before, we start with the interdependent penalties equal on all demand 
nodes within each system. Table 5 summarizes the progression of our algorithm 
for this scenario. Iteration 1 solves the FDM model to optimality as an isolated 
system. Like the base case, no loads are shed within the FDM. The results are 
passed as parameters to the PFM. The PFM is then solved to optimality in 
Iteration 2. With generating capacity less than power demand, we observe load 
shedding from some of the demand nodes. Because the demand nodes have 
equal penalties across each system, power could be shed from any of the 
demands or even from any subset of the group. If the power is shed from one or 
more of the interdependent demand nodes, then the effects would cascade to the 
fuel system. Recall from the combined model results, the optimal solution 
involves shedding both interdependent and independent demand nodes to reach 
the combined optimal solution. In the case of equal load shedding penalties, 
CPLEX solves with the following nodes and loads shed:  
 d107 with 55.7 mwhr (independent demand node),  
 d110 with 195 mwhr (independent demand node). 
The results are passed as parameters to the FDM, but at this point the system 
has achieved a stable solution. The sum of the FDM and PFM objective values in 
this configuration is $97,576.  
We resolve the combined model under the assumed loss of g118 resulting in 
the total optimal objective value of $86,126 with the following nodes and loads shed: 
 d103 with 180 mwhr (interdependent),  
 d109 with 70.7 mwhr(independent). 
Comparing the separate model solution to the combined model we see the 
separate model is 13.3% from optimality using our iterative algorithm. Comparing 
the combined model to this run of our algorithm, we continue to see a need to 
develop a dynamic way of establishing interdependent penalties. 
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Reduced Generating Capacity Available (g118 offline) & Constant Load 














1 FDM 4460 N/A N/A 
Optimal FDM solution in 
isolation, no load 
shedding 
2 PFM 4460 93116 97576 
The following loads were 
shed: d107-55.7mwhr*, 
d110-195mwhr*. 
3 FDM 4460 93116 97576 
No Change, stable 
condition met in FDM 
4 PFM 4460 93116 97576 
No Change, stable 
condition met in PFM 
Combined Model  6510 79616 86126 
The following loads were 
shed: d103-180mwhr, 
d109-70.7mwhr*.                                                                            
Table 5.   Results from our initial iterative algorithm with reduced 
power generating capacity available (generator node g118 offline) 
and a constant and equal load shedding penalties on all demand 
nodes for each system. * Independent demand node. 
2. Double the load shedding penalty on all the interdependent 
demand nodes for each system 
Here again, we increase the load shedding penalties on interdependent 
nodes by a factor of two, with the reduced generating capacity. Table 6 
summarizes the progression of our algorithm. Iteration 1 solves the FDM model 
to optimality as an isolated system. As before, we observe all fuel demands are 
met. The results are passed to the PFM as parameters. The PFM is then solved 
to optimality in Iteration 2. We see the same response as the previous run with 
equal and constant penalties across each system. The difference is that with the 
higher penalties on the interdependent nodes all independent demand node 
loading is shed before any of the interdependent demand loading. This case 
protects the integrity of the combined system before exogenous demands. Loads 
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are shed first within the set of independent nodes, then in the interdependent 
demand node loads. In this case, the following nodes and loads are shed:  
 d107 with 55.7 mwhr (independent demand node),  
 d110 with 195 mwhr (independent demand node). 
The results are passed as parameters to the FDM, after which the solution is 
determined to be stable. The total objective value in this configuration is $97,576. 
Comparing the solution for the separate model solution to that for the combined 
model, we see the separate model has a solution that is 13.3% from optimality 
using our algorithm. This case demonstrates how setting the penalty for 
interdependent demand nodes higher than the independent demand nodes 
improves the integrity of the system. Ideally, the formulation itself would 
determine which components of each system are the most important and then 
assign corresponding penalties for load shedding.  
 
Reduced Generating Capacity Available (g118 offline) & Double Load 














1 FDM 4460 N/A N/A 
Optimal FDM solution in 
isolation, no load 
shedding 
2 PFM 4460 93116 97576 
The following loads were 
shed: d107-55.7mwhr*, 
d110-195mwhr*. 
3 FDM 4460 93116 97576 
No Change, stable 
condition met in FDM 
4 PFM 4460 93116 97576 
No Change, stable 
condition met in PFM 
Combined Model  6510 79616 86126 
The following loads were 
shed: d103-180mwhr, 
d109-70.7mwhr*.                                                                            
Table 6.   Results from our initial iterative algorithm with reduced 
power generating capacity available (generator node g118 offline) 
and a double the original load shedding penalties on all demand 
nodes for each system.* Independent demand node. 
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3. No load shedding penalty on the interdependent demand 
nodes for each system. 
As before, we make the load shedding penalties on interdependent 
demand nodes zero. Table 7 summarizes how the algorithm progresses through 
this scenario. Iteration 1 solves the FDM model to optimality as an isolated 
system. Here again, we observe that the lack of a load shedding penalty on the 
interdependent nodes results in a failure to fill their associated fuel demand. The 
FDM objective value is cut by 64.1% due to not delivering fuel to these nodes. 
The solution is passed as parameters to the PFM in Iteration 2. The PFM is then 
solved to optimality. We observe that the generators requiring fuel oil to produce 
power (interdependent generators) do not produce any because they did not 
receive fuel in the fuel model. The interdependent demand nodes (corresponding 
FDM components) also did not receive power because the load shedding 
penalties are also set to zero. We see more expensive means of power 
generation used to try to meet all the power demand with non-zero load-shedding 
penalties. Because the system does not have enough capacity to fill all the 
demands, it cannot avoid load shedding from the following independent demand 
nodes: 
 d107 shedding 125mwhr,  
 d108 shedding 171mwhr,  
 d109 shedding 104mwhr,  
 d110 shedding 195mwhr.  
The reduction in demand for power, due to no power load shedding 
penalty for dependent nodes, pushes the objective value down, as less power 
needs to be generated. However, using more expensive generators and having 
595 megawatt hours of power shed acts to increase the objective value. The 
overall effect on the PFM objective value is an increase of 13.8% to $90,579. The 
results are passed as parameters to the FDM. When the FDM is solved again, 
with all the fuel demand components in the power system receiving no power, 
the entire FDM is shut down and the FDM objective value reaches its max value 
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of $135,000. In this case, three total solves are required for stable results. The 
total objective value and in this configuration is $225,579. Comparing the 
separate model solution to the combined model at reduced capacity we see the 
separate model is 162% from optimality of the combined value. Comparing the 
run with the base case we see that a non-zero load shedding penalty is required 
to provide the driving force for power to flow to a demand.  
 
Reduced Generating Capacity Available (g118 offline) & No Load 














1 FDM 1600 N/A N/A 
All interdependent fuel 
demand nodes loadings 
were shed 
2 PFM 1600 90579 92179 
All interdependent power 
demand nodes loadings 





3 FDM 135000 90579 225579 
No fuel is delivered, all 
fuel demands are shed 
4 PFM 135000 90579 225579 
No Change, stable 
condition met in PFM 
5 FDM 135000 90579 225579 
No Change, stable 
condition met in FDM 
Combined Model  6510 79616 86126 
The following loads were 






100mwhr.                
Table 7.   Results from our initial iterative algorithm with reduced 
power generating capacity available (generator node g118 offline) 
and no load shedding penalties on all interdependent demand 
nodes for each system. * Independent demand node. 
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F. EXCESS CAPACITY REDUCTION VIA A KNAPSACK SUBROUTINE  
Our first attempt to establish dynamic interdependent demands between 
models aims at reducing the total objective function value by removing the use of 
fuel oil generators, if possible to do so, without incurring load shedding penalties. 
To accomplish this task, we employ a knapsack type subroutine where we use 
an MIP formulation to choose the most expensive subset of generators requiring 
fuel (grf) and shutting them off, while reducing the total power capacity to no less 
than the total demand. This subroutine forces the use of power generation from 
sources other than fuel oil, saving money in the transportation of fuel oil to the 
associated fuel demand nodes. By design, the PFM uses the cheapest available 
generators, thus the only possible effect on the PFM objective function is to 
increase or at best hold it constant.  
We run the subroutine after the initial PFM solve and after each addition 
PFM solve. This subroutine could be run first and only once, but we would like to 
see how or if it changes the progression of the overall algorithm. We explore the 
same three cases for penalties on interdependent demand nodes with all 
generators available and power generation capacity greater than demand. 
1. Constant and equal load shedding penalty on demand nodes 
per system. 
Table 8 summarizes the progression of our iterative algorithm with our 
subroutine when used for the base case. Here we assign high and equal load 
shedding penalties for every demand node in each system. In iteration 1, we 
solve the FDM model to optimality as an isolated system. We observe that all the 
fuel demands were met, and the results are then passed as parameters to the 
PFM. In iteration 2, the PFM is solved to optimality with the results passed as 
parameters back to the FDM. Iteration 3 implements the subroutine which 
determines that shutting off the following generators will maximize the cost 
savings:  g107a, g115a, g115b, g115c, g115d, and g115e. The subroutine shuts 
off or reduces the fuel demands of the associated generator that were turned off 
as follows:  FN1 to 0 barrels/hr or 0% of the original flow and FN4 to 300 
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barrels/hr or 66.6% of the original flow. It also adjusts the threshold for fuel flow 
such that the required fuel is reduced equivalently. Iteration 4 solves the FDM 
again to optimality. The FDM objective value is now $3825, a reduction of 16.6%. 
The results are passed as parameters to the PFM. Iteration five solves the PFM 
to optimality with a PFM objective value of $79,710, an increase of 0.1%. The 
total objective value for solving the separate operator models with 
interdependencies using our algorithm and subroutine is now $83,535. 
Comparing the separate model solution to the combined model we see the 
separate model shrinks to 16.5% from 17.2% without the subroutine. This is an 
improvement of 0.7% 
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Full Generating Capacity Available & Constant Load Shedding Penalty on all demand 













1 FDM 4460 N/A N/A 
Optimal FDM solution in 
isolation, no load shedding 
2 PFM 4460 79593 84053 
Optimal PFM solution in 
isolation, no load shedding 
3 SubR       
Fuel dependent generator 
shut off:                  g107a, 
g115a, g115b, g115c,g115d, 
g115e                Fuel Demands 
changes as a % or original 
value:                                                 
FN1-0 barrels/hr (0%), FN4-
300 barrels/hr (66.6%) 
4 FDM 3825 79593 83418 
Optimal FDM solution in 
isolation (16.6% reduction in 
FDM objective value). No load 
shedding, 
5 PFM 3825 79710 83535 
Small increase in PFM 
objective value due to using 
more expensive generators. 
6 SubR       
No Change from previous 
subroutine run. 
7 FDM 3825 79710 83535 
No Change, stable condition 
met in FDM 
8 PFM 3825 79710 83535 
No Change, stable condition 
met in PFM 
Combined Model  4735 66956 71691 
Utilizing the subroutine the 
Separate model solution 
improves to 16.5% from  
17.2% from optimality. The 
following loads were shed: 




54mwhr*, d116-100mwhr.                                         
* Independent demand node.  
Table 8.   Results from our iterative algorithm with subroutine, all 
generators available, and a constant and equal load shedding 
penalties on all demand nodes for each system.  
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1. Double the load shedding penalties for interdependent nodes  
Table 9 summarizes the progression of our algorithm again for the case 
where we increase the load shedding penalty on interdependent nodes by a 
factor of two, now with our subroutine for removing excess capacity by removing 
interdependent generators. As expected, this run progresses exactly as the 
previous run because the subroutine only removes excess power capacity, thus 
no load shedding occurs, and the results are exactly the same. Table 9 describes 
how the algorithm progresses. 
  
 52 
Full Generating Capacity Available & Double Load Shedding Penalty on                                      














1 FDM 4460 N/A N/A 
Optimal FDM solution in 
isolation, no load shedding 
2 PFM 4460 79593 84053 
Optimal PFM solution in 
isolation, no load shedding 
3 SubR       
Fuel dependent generator 
shut off:                  g107a, 
g115a, g115b, g115c,g115d, 
g115e                Fuel Demands 
changes as a % or original 
value:                                                 
FN1-0 barrels/hr (0%), FN4-
300 barrels/hr (66.6%) 
4 FDM 3825 79593 83418 
Optimal FDM solution in 
isolation (16.6% reduction in 
FDM objective value). No load 
shedding, 
5 PFM 3825 79710 83535 
Small increase in PFM 
objective value due to using 
more expensive generators. 
6 SubR       
No Change from previous 
subroutine run. 
7 FDM 3825 79710 83535 
No Change, stable condition 
met in FDM 
8 PFM 3825 79710 83535 
No Change, stable condition 
met in PFM 
Combined Model  4735 66956 71691 
Utilizing the subroutine the 
Separate model solution 
improves to 16.5% from  
17.2% from optimality. The 
following loads were shed: 




54mwhr*, d116-100mwhr.                                         
* Independent demand node.  
Table 9.   Results from our iterative algorithm with subroutine, all 
generators available, and double the load shedding penalties on 
interdependent demand nodes. 
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2. Zero load shedding penalties for interdependent nodes  
Table 10 summarizes the progression of our algorithm detailing the case 
where we have zero load shedding penalties on interdependent nodes, and 
where we implement our subroutine for removing excess capacity by removing 
interdependent generators. As expected this run appears exactly as our baseline 
without the subroutine. The subroutine only removes excess power capacity of 
interdependent generators. Without a load shedding penalties, all interdependent 
generators will not receive fuel in the FDM and thus are inoperable in the PFM.  
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Full Generating Capacity Available & No Load Shedding Penalty on                                                  














1 FDM 1600 N/A N/A 
All interdependent fuel 
demand nodes loadings 
were shed 
2 PFM 1600 70771 72371 
All interdependent power 
demand nodes loadings 
were shed plus d119-181 
mwhr* & d120 -14 mwhr* 
3 SubR       
Fuel dependent generator 
shut off:  g107a, g115a, 
g115b, g115c, g115d, 
g115e. 
Fuel Demands changes as 
a % or original value:                                                 
FN1-0 barrels/hr (0%), 
FN4-300 barrels/hr 
(66.6%) 
4 FDM 135000 70771 205771 
No fuel is delivered, all 
fuel demands are shed 
5 PFM 135000 70771 205771 
No Change, stable 
condition met in PFM 
6 FDM 135000 70771 205771 
No Change, stable 
condition met in FDM 
Combined Model  4735 66956 71691 
The following loads were 






100mwhr.                                                                       
Table 10.   Results from our iterative algorithm with subroutine, 
all generators available, and no load shedding penalties on 
interdependent demand nodes. * Independent demand node. 
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G. RESULTS SUMMARY 
Figures 11 and 12 provide a summary of the results from both separately 
solved interdependent models alongside the results from solving the 
corresponding combined model. 
Iterative Algorithm 
  
All Generators Available                                 
(100% Capacity) 
Generator g118 outage (86.7% 
Capacity) 
Penalty equal double  zero Monolithic equal double  zero Monolithic 
number of 
iterations 
2 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 
Fuel Objective 
Value 
4460 4460 135000 4735 4460 4460 135000 6510 
Power 
Objective Value 
79593 79593 70771 66956 93116 93116 90579 79616 
Total Objective 
Value 
84053 84053 205771 71691 97576 97576 225579 86126 
Figure 11.  Summary results from our Iterative Algorithm 
Iterative Algorithm with Subroutine 
  





Penalty equal double  zero Monolithic equal double  zero 
number of solves 5 5 4 1 Subroutine requires 
excess generating 
capacity to affect the 
objective values 
Fuel Objective Value 3825 3825 135000 4735 
Power Objective Value 79710 79710 70771 66956 
Total Objective Value 83535 83535 205771 71691 
Figure 12.  Summary results from our Iterative Algorithm with subroutine 
Looking at Figures 11 and 12 we see the effectiveness in solving the full 
combined model. When examining solutions of the iterative algorithm on the 
separate operator models, it is clear that setting the load shedding penalty 
appropriately is crucial for determining how close the solution is to that of the 
combined model.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Although building and solving operational models of isolated infrastructure 
systems allows for easier modeling and the direct application of standard, 
attacker-defender algorithms to optimally enhance resiliency, these types of 
studies ignore interdependencies between infrastructure systems, and can hide 
vulnerabilities to a system that involve damage to a completely different system. 
These studies are common and can reveal important information about 
weaknesses and vital components which should be hardened, but our work 
seeks to expand the space of study to explicitly account for interdependencies in 
the operational models. 
We modeled two well-known systems and validated their behavior and 
responses to different scenarios using two different formulations. From there, we 
modeled their interdependencies and generated a scenario for our case study to 
allow us to demonstrate the feasibility of our technique on a medium-sized and 
medium-complexity pair of systems. We compared these solutions against a 
monolithic “combined” model, including all the components for both systems, 
which established a true baseline for optimal performance. We also explored a 
family of iterative algorithms based on setting policies for load shedding penalties 
to interdependent infrastructure demand nodes, and found feasible solutions of 
varying quality, some of which were within 16% of the true optimum.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The next phase in this research should focus on mechanisms to 
communicate demands, and, more specifically, the consequences of not 
satisfying those demands, more directly between the separate models of the 
individual infrastructures. We began to address this with the simple subroutine 
that evaluated extra capacity and directly shutoff any “requirements” for excess 
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fuel. Although this specific subroutine only works with excess capacity, it does 
work to change demand and associated load shedding penalties. 
The FDM can be improved by adding more details and specific 
components that were implied in our work but never actually formally inserted 
(i.e., pumps on arcs that require electrical power to allow flow). This may allow 
for a subroutine that could compare costs and benefits of turning on a pump 
without having to reference the PFM directly, possibly using an estimate of 
average power cost for that pump or a heuristic estimate based on more detailed 
engineering models. 
We effectively built, tested, and began to explore methods to have the 
separate systems pass information back and forth and solve to feasible solutions. 
More work is required in this area to get acceptably close to the optimal solution. 
The first step should be to investigate the use of dynamic penalties for load 
shedding to dependent nodes; these could be updated at each iteration based on 
requirements in the corresponding system. This might be accomplished by in the 
PFM by taking an average of the cost of power generated during each iterative 
solve. The second step would be to establish more realistic power demands for 
fuel components by increasing the detail of the FDM (pumps, heater, agitators, 
etc.). This will give more flexibility in the types of dependences that could be 




APPENDIX A. GAMS CODE 
A. SHARED ELEMENTS OF THE PFM AND FDM 
Sets 




















d(pn) power demand nodes / 
$include power.demands.txt 
/ 
i(pn) power buse nodes / 
$include power.buses.txt 
/ 





















g(pn) power generator nodes / 
$include power.generating_units.txt 
/ 

































FY(fi,fj)    Flow in arc fi fj in barrels 
PY_pos(pn,pn) power flow on line l (MW) 









Scalar zp /0/ 
; 
 
B. FUEL ELEMENTS 
set 
Fedge(fn,fn) fuel edges 
*Establish Fuel Edges via NPS convention 






loop(farcs(fi,fj)$(ord(fi) < ord(fj)), 
  Fedge(fi,fj)=yes;) 
; 
set 





table fuel_arc_data(fi,fj,*) FArcCost(cost) 











Parameter PThreshold(pdn) Power required for node fpn 






FLdS(fp)         fuel shortfall at node n 
; 
binary variable 
FT(i,pdn,fi,fn)   Binary switch turning capcity of 






  FObj 
  FuelNodeBalance(fn) 
  FuelMinFlow(fi,fj) 
  FuelMaxFlow(fi,fj) 
  PowerDepFuel_FM(i,pdn,fi,fj) 
  FuelDepGen_FM(i,pdn,fi,fn) 
  FLdS_UB(fn) 
  NoFLdSForSupplier(fn) 
; 
*Fuel network objective 
  FObj.. 
    fz =e= sum((FArcs(fi,fj)), 
fuel_arc_data(fi,fj,’cost’)*FY(fi,fj)+ 
         
fuel_arc_data(fi,fj,’cost_dam’)*fuel_arc_data(fi,fj,’x
’)*FY(fi,fj)) 
         + 
sum(fn,fuel_node_data(fn,’penalty’)*FLdS(fn)) 
  ; 
  FuelNodeBalance(fn).. 
    sum(FArcs(fn,fj), FY(fn,fj))- 
sum(FArcs(fj,fn),FY(fj,fn))-FLdS(fn)=l= 
         fuel_node_data(fn,’supply’) 
  ; 
  FuelMinFlow(fi,fj)$FArcs(fi,fj).. 
    0 =L= FY(fi,fj) + FY(fj,fi) 
  ; 
  FuelMaxFlow(fi,fj)$FArcs(fi,fj).. 
    FY(fi,fj) + FY(fj,fi) =L= 
fuel_arc_data(fi,fj,’cap’) 
  ; 
  PowerDepFuel_FM(i,pdn,fi,fj)$PDFN(i,pdn,fi,fj).. 




  ; 
  FuelDepGen_FM(i,pdn,fi,fj)$PDFN(i,pdn,fi,fj).. 
     PThreshold(pdn)*FT(i,pdn,fi,fj) =l= 
Sum(PArcs(pn,pdn),PY_pos(pn,pdn)-PY_neg(pn,pdn)) 
  ; 
  FLdS_UB(fd).. 
     FLdS(fd) =l=  -fuel_node_data(fd,’supply’) 
  ; 
  NoFLdSForSupplier(fs).. 
     FLdS(fs)=e=0 
  ; 
parameter FRec(fd) 
; 




































Display fz.l, FY.l, FLds.l,FT.l; 
loop(fd, 





E. POWER ELEMENTS 
set 


































parameter   Bi(pn,pn) susceptance 
; 
Loop(PArcs(pi,pj), 





PEdge(pn,pn) electric edges 
; 
parameter 
FThreshold(fdn)    Fuel required for node pdn in the 
power network to function 
; 
loop(fdn, 
FThreshold(fdn) = -fuel_node_data(fdn,’supply’);) 
; 
loop(PArcs(pi,pj)$(ord(pi) < ord(pj)), 
  PEdge(pi,pj)=yes;) 
; 
Variable 
  pz objective value 
  theta(pn) phase angle at bus i 
; 
positive variables 
  PGen(g) power generated by g (MW) 






   PObj 
   PowerFlowOnLine(pn,pn) 
   PowerBusBalance(i) 
   PowerGenBalance(g) 
   PowerDemBalance(d) 
   PowerOneArc(pi,pj) 
   PowerMinPowerOnLine(pn,pn) 
   PowerMinPowerOnLineT(g,i,fi,fdn) 
   PowerMaxPowerOnLine(pn,pn) 
   PowerMaxPowerOnLineT(g,i,fi,fdn) 
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   PowerMaxPowerProduction(g) 
   PowerMaxPowerProductDep(grf) 
   PowerLoadShed(d) 
   Threshold_PM(g,i,fi,fdn) 
   TotalDemand 
; 
 PObj.. 




* XX(b,bb)* Pline(b,bb) =e= 
Bi(b,bb)*(XX(b,bb)*(theta(bb) - theta(b))) 
  (PY_pos(pi,pj)-PY_neg(pi,pj)) =e= 
Bi(pi,pj)*(theta(pj) - theta(pi)) 
; 
 PowerBusBalance(i).. 
   sum(PArcs(pn,i),(PY_pos(pn,i)-PY_neg(pn,i)))=e= 0 
; 
 PowerGenBalance(g).. 
   PGen(g) - sum(PArcs(g,pn), (PY_pos(g,pn)-
PY_neg(g,pn)) ) =e= 0 
; 
 PowerDemBalance(d).. 








  -1 * PArcCap(pi,pj) =l= (PY_pos(pi,pj)-
PY_neg(pi,pj)) 
*  -1 * XX(b,bb)*PbarLine(b,bb) =l= Pline(b,bb) 
; 
 PowerMinPowerOnLineT(g,i,fi,fdn)$FDPN(g,i,fi,fdn).. 
  -1 * PArcCap(g,i)*PT(g,i,fi,fdn) =l= (PY_pos(g,i)-
PY_neg(g,i)) 
*  -1 * XX(b,bb)*PbarLine(b,bb) =l= Pline(b,bb) 
; 
 PowerMaxPowerOnLine(pi,pj)$PArcs(pi,pj).. 
   (PY_pos(pi,pj)-PY_neg(pi,pj)) =l= PArcCap(pi,pj)*1 




   (PY_pos(g,i)-PY_neg(g,i)) =l= 
PArcCap(g,i)*PT(g,i,fi,fdn) 










   PGen(g) =l= PGenCap(g) 
; 
 PowerLoadShed(d).. 
   PLdS(d) =l= PDem(d) 
; 
 Threshold_PM(g,i,fi,fdn)$FDPN(g,i,fi,fdn).. 





   Sum(d,PDem(d))=e=Sum(g,PGen(g))+sum(d,PLdS(d)) 
; 











































Display   pz.l,PY_pos.l,PY_neg.l, theta.l,PGen.l, 
PLdS.l,PT.l,FY.l,FThreshold,PTotalGenCap,PTotalDem 
; 
G. SUBROUTINE ELEMENTS 
Scalar MWhr_to_BarrelsPerHr /1.875/ 
; 
variable 
  fsz  objective 
; 
equation 
  FSubObj 
  CapGenOff 
; 
FSubObj.. 















H. SUBROUTINE EXECUTION 









loop(fdn$(-fuel_node_data(fdn,’supply’) gt 0), 
FThreshold(fdn) = -fuel_node_data(fdn,’supply’);) 
; 
Display  fuel_node_data, FThreshold 
; 
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i103 d103 fn10 fn6 
i103 d103 fn10 fn11 
i105 d105 fn10 fn13 
i105 d105 fn10p fn10 
i114 d114 fn8p fn8 
i114 d114 fn8 fn4p 
i116 d116 fn8 fn4 
i116 d116 fn8 fn7 







tail head cap cost cost_dam x t 
FN1 FN2 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN1 FN5 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN2 FN1 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN2 FN3 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN2 FN2p 1350 0 0 0 1 
FN2p FN3 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN2 FN7 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN3 FN2p 1350 0 0 0 1 
FN2p FN2 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN3 FN2 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN4 FN8 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN4 FN4p 1350 0 0 0 1 
FN4p FN8 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN5 FN1 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN5 FN9 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN6 FN7 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN6 FN10 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN7 FN2 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN7 FN6 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN7 FN8 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN8 FN4 1350 1 10 0 1 
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FN8 FN4p 1350 0 0 0 1 
FN8p FN8 1350 0.0001 0 0 1 
FN4p FN4 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN8 FN7 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN8 FN12 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN10p FN10 1350 0.0001 0 0 1 
FN9 FN5 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN9 FN13 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN10 FN6 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN10 FN11 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN10 FN13 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN11 FN10 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN11 FN12 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN11 FN15 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN12 FN8 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN12 FN11 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN12 FN12p 1350 0 0 0 1 
FN12p FN16 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN12 FN16 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN13 FN9 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN13 FN10 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN13 FN14 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN14 FN13 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN14 FN15 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN15 FN11 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN15 FN14 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN16 FN12 1350 1 10 0 1 
FN16 FN12p 1350 0 0 0 1 
FN12p FN12 1350 1 10 0 1 
19. Fuel.node.data.csv 
node supply penalty 
FN1 -112.5 150 
FN2 -100 150 
FN2p 0 0 
FN3 -100 150 
FN4 -450 150 
FN4p 0 0 
FN5 -100 150 
FN6 -100 150 
FN7 -100 150 
FN8 0 150 
FN8P 1350 0 
FN9 -100 150 
FN10 0 150 
FN10P 1350 0 
FN11 -100 150 
FN12 -100 150 
FN12p 0 0 
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FN13 -285 150 
FN14 -100 150 
FN15 -285 150 
FN16 -535 150 
 
20. FuelIntDep.csv 
g101c i101 fn11 fn15 
g101d i101 fn11 fn15 
g102c i102 fn9 fn13 
g102d i102 fn9 fn13 
g107a i107 fn8 fn4 
g107b i107 fn8 fn4 
g107c i107 fn8 fn4 
g101c i101 fn14 fn15 
g101d i101 fn14 fn15 
g102c i102 fn14 fn13 
g102d i102 fn14 fn13 
g107a i107 fn8 fn4p 
g107b i107 fn8 fn4p 
g107c i107 fn8 fn4p 
g113a i113 fn12 fn16 
g113b i113 fn12 fn16 
g113c i113 fn12 fn16 
g115a i115 fn2 fn1 
g115b i115 fn2 fn1 
g115c i115 fn2 fn1 
g115d i115 fn2 fn1 
g115e i115 fn2 fn1 
g113a i113 fn12p fn16 
g113b i113 fn12p fn16 
g113c i113 fn12p fn16 
g115a i115 fn5 fn1 
g115b i115 fn5 fn1 
g115c i115 fn5 fn1 
g115d i115 fn5 fn1 
g115e i115 fn5 fn1 
g102c i102 fn10 fn13 



























































































Resistance on all arcs is set to 5 
25. power.reactance.line.data.csv 
Reactance on all arcs is set to 1 
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